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Development and Negative Constructions 
of Ethnic Identity: Responses to Asian 
Fisheries Investment in the Pacific
Kate Barclay
Ethnicity may take shape through state-led purposeful schemes of nation 
building. It also takes shape, however, through a multitude of banal, daily 
encounters. The interactions that help shape people’s senses of their own 
(and others’) ethnicities often take place in the context of mundane errands 
conducted through state institutions, such as post offices, which may, for 
example, display national flags (Billig 1995). In countries such as those in 
Melanesia with relatively weak states and where people have correspond-
ingly less interaction with state institutions, the encounters that cumula-
tively build senses of nationhood may equally be with international orga-
nizations, such as aid donors, nongovernmental organizations (ngos), and 
corporations (Foster 2002).
This article explores ethnic identity in Solomon Islands and Papua New 
Guinea as it arises through engagement with two tuna fishing and canning 
companies: Solomon Taiyo Ltd and rd Tuna. Solomon Taiyo Ltd, based 
in Noro in the Western Province of Solomon Islands (map 1), was estab-
lished in 1973 by Japanese fishing giant Taiy? Gyogy? Kabushiki Kaisha 
(renamed Maruha Corporation in 1993) and the Solomon Islands govern-
ment. The company was the largest private sector employer in the country 
and one of the largest exporters, second only to the logging sector. In 2000 
the company employed around 2,500 Solomon Islanders, but changes in 
the global tuna market and Maruha’s corporate strategy resulted in the 
Japanese partner withdrawing; operations subsequently continued under 
government ownership as Soltai Fishing and Processing Ltd. rd Tuna, 
wholly owned by a Filipino company, started in Madang in 1997, and for-
eign investment is ongoing (map 2). Papua New Guinea’s cash economy is 
much larger than that of Solomon Islands and is dominated by the logging 
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and mining sectors, so rd Tuna has not been as important in the national 
economy as Solomon Taiyo was to the Solomons. But rd Tuna is never-
theless economically significant, especially in the Madang area, and has a 
workforce of around 3,000 Papua New Guineans. Both companies have 
been important symbols of national economic progress but were also trou-
bling as such because, instead of demonstrating a fully indigenous capac-
ity to succeed in the global tuna industry, they were led by foreign inves-
tors. Local citizens’ daily encounters with the companies occurred through 
contact with the fishing vessels and crews in ports and fishing areas, and 
through people’s roles as employees, consumers of the companies’ prod-
ucts, and contractors of services to the companies. Representations of the 
companies in public discourse reveal the kinds of national identity built 
through these encounters and in the context of wider social influences, 
such as histories of colonialism, ongoing struggles with development, and 
domestic politics.
The thinking behind this article evolved from a discovery during my 
fieldwork on Solomon Taiyo in 1999. I was tracing evidence for com-
plaints against the company and found, contrary to my expectations, that 
the company was behaving more socially and environmentally responsibly 
than prevalent public opinion about the company had led me to believe. 
For example, it was often assumed that Solomon Taiyo was depleting tuna 
stocks, whereas its practice of pole-and-line fishing for skipjack is actually 
one of the most environmentally friendly types of industrial tuna fishery 
(Stone, Toribau, and Tolvanen 2009). Not all complaints were errone-
ous, but in general the representations of Solomon Taiyo as a corporate 
wrongdoer went beyond the available evidence. Later research on rd 
Tuna revealed a similar pattern; while there were certainly grounds for 
complaint, the magnitude of the complaints often exceeded them. I have 
explored the main complaints and the evidence for them in previous pub-
lications (Barclay and Cartwright 2007; Barclay 2008). This is not to say 
that my preconception that the companies were bad corporate citizens 
was replaced by a belief that they were good corporate citizens. Rather, 
I found that local people experienced a range of positive and negative 
effects from the operations of these companies and that, on close reading 
of people’s reactions to the companies, their opinions of the companies 
could best be described as ambivalent (Barclay 2008). This, however, was 
on close reading. The fact remains that the foregrounded opinion of the 
two companies is generally negative.
In light of this, complaints against these companies may be under-
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stood as representations, reflecting the worldviews of the people involved, 
including identifications of self and others.1 Elsewhere I have explored 
this idea for Japanese, white, and Okinawan identities (Barclay 2006, 
2007).2 The aim of this article is to investigate representations of Solomon 
Taiyo and rd Tuna to reveal aspects of Solomon Islander and Papua New 
 Guinean identities.
The expectation that foreign investors will not act in the best interests 
of the host society is prevalent everywhere, not just in the Pacific Islands. 
Can an analysis of stories of corporate wrongdoing by foreign investors, 
therefore, add anything to our understandings of Solomon Islander and 
Papua New Guinean identities in particular? Broadly speaking, antipathy 
to foreign investors may arise from xenophobia, which can exist in any 
ethnic group; however, the precise nature of responses to foreign investors 
is colored by specific histories of relations with outsiders. The first part of 
this article looks at the kinds of national identity visible in representations 
of Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna and finds that they exhibit a “frog perspec-
tive,” that is, a sense of looking up at the world from a subordinate posi-
tion. This may be seen as the result of Solomon Islands’ and Papua New 
Guinea’s colonial past and ongoing status as “least-developed nations.” 
Another aspect of local identities as they emerge in representations of Sol-
omon Taiyo and rd Tuna is that they are negatively constructed to con-
trast with external Others who are seen as detrimental to the in-group. In 
other words, strong economic nationalism is exhibited in representations 
of these companies, but this nationalism is not based in a sense of shared 
culture or race, or in shared purpose toward a goal; it is more a reaction 
against outsiders than a binding together of insiders. The kind of local 
identity visible in complaints against Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna is one 
of sufferers of “negative impacts.” These companies are understood as 
vehicles through which powerful foreigners exploit vulnerable locals, and 
national identity emerges through this experience. “Negative impact” is 
a discourse through which specific kinds of Solomon Islander and Papua 
New Guinean identities are reproduced.
The second part of the article looks at what negative impact identifica-
tion has meant for Solomon Islanders and Papua New Guineans in their 
struggles over the development these companies are supposed to bring. 
Stories of negative impact from Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna have served 
a variety of social and political purposes, one of which is as a form of 
resistance against companies that have brought social and environmental 
problems without all of the hoped-for benefits of modernity. On the other 
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hand, identifying as negatively impacted also constitutes a form of vic-
tim identification. Furthermore, the discourse of negative impact is often 
polemical—completely rejecting the development introduced by Solomon 
Taiyo and rd Tuna—even though people’s actual engagement with these 
companies is much more complex. Solomon Islanders and Papua New 
Guineans generally want the health and wealth benefits of modernity but 
also want to retain valued parts of indigenous culture and ways of life—
locally appropriate versions of modernity. Discourses of negative impact 
risk falling into the rut of tired old pro- and antidevelopment arguments, 
which obscure more important questions about what people want from 
these companies and how their wants might be satisfied. Creating locally 
appropriate forms of modernity may involve moving beyond identifying 
as negatively impacted to other ways of relating to foreign investors.
Identity Reproduction through Stories 
of Negative Impact
Public representations of Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna have often been 
strikingly negative. The following poem contains a word play on the name 
of Solomon Taiyo’s best-selling local product “Solomon Blue” (figure 1). 
The poem expresses public perceptions of Solomon Taiyo that were preva-
lent during its nearly three decades of operation.
Solomon Blue
You reap a harvest
you did not plant
You drain my resources
in the name of development
You fish in my waters
for bonito
You pay me a little 
for permission
You process your catch
compressed into cans
You pour back your waste into our seas
Pollution!
Then you sell back to me,
at a profit
Solomon Blue
Jully Sipolo, “Praying Parents”
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The following extract from a website reflects widespread perceptions of 
rd Tuna in Papua New Guinea:
Members of the Kananam community (Madang, Papua New Guinea) have 
formed the Idawad Association to protest the development of a huge tuna 
can nery on their land. The wholly Filipino owned company r.d. Tuna have 
gained access to a wharf facility on Kananam land, after a land deal with the 
Catholic Church and the Madang Provincial Government carried out behind 
the backs of Kananam landowners . . . Kananam leaders such as James Sungai 
and Francis Gem are furious, and point out that the cannery and wharf facility 
are seriously polluting their lagoon, wetlands, water and air, workers are very 
lowly paid (less than us$2/day) and union organisers have been sacked. r.d. 
Tuna ships are encouraging a prostitution trade in the Kananam community. 
All senior managers are Filipino, and all profits are sent to the Philippines. r.d. 
Tuna pays no tax in png. join the international campaign to suport 
[sic] the kananam community! boycott rd tuna products! (Friends of 
Kana nam nd)
Both extracts air negative views (as opposed to ambivalent views) about 
the type of development brought about by the fishing and processing 
operations. They also portray oppositional relations between “us” and 
“them,” with the companies as “them.”
Representations of both companies have often made strong connections 
between negative effects of operations and foreign ownership of the com-
Figure 1 Solomon Blue canned flake tuna label. Reproduced with permission.
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panies or foreigners employed by the companies. For example, ngo leader 
Panatina told me about the sexual relations taking place between male 
crewmembers from Solomon Taiyo fishing boats and women in villages 
near baitfishing grounds, relations that were frequently cited as one of the 
company’s main negative impacts. She said: “We can’t regulate the sex life 
of the people,” but perhaps “a policy or something could be written down 
so foreigners don’t do this.”3 Church leaders and town officials expressed 
concern about prostitution around the Solomon Taiyo factory in Noro 
along similarly nationalist (and patriarchal) lines, describing it as “selling 
women to foreigners.”4 The matron at the Noro Women’s Hostel, home 
to many cannery workers, said that sometimes men came to the hostel 
asking for access to the women who lived there, and her response to them 
was that she was “not selling Solomon Islanders.”5
An interesting element in these depictions is the prominent role given 
to foreigners. Solomon Islander crewmembers had outnumbered foreign-
ers (mostly Okinawans) on Solomon Taiyo vessels since the 1980s, and 
by the late 1990s more than 90 percent of crews were Solomon Islanders. 
Interviews, fieldwork observations, and documentary evidence indicated 
that Solomon Islander crewmembers were just as likely as Okinawan 
crew members to engage in sexual relations with villagers, with just as 
many attendant problems of unplanned pregnancies and alcohol-fueled 
violence (Barclay 2008). As I probed beyond their initial representations, 
my interviewees also acknowledged the active roles played by Solomon 
Islanders. The matron of the Women’s Hostel said Solomon Islander as 
well as foreign men approached the hostel. Village elder Kindu started out 
her interview by saying that when Solomon Taiyo vessels first came to fish 
near her village, she was very unhappy with the Japanese crewmembers 
coming ashore and “chasing” local women. As her interview progressed, 
however, she said that local women also “chased” the foreign fishermen, 
and that women’s families might facilitate such relationships because the 
Oki nawan fishermen were generous with store-bought goods.6 The first 
and most prominent stories about social problems associated with Solo-
mon Taiyo, however, usually presented unsanctioned sexual liaisons as 
something foreign men did to local women.
Why would Solomon Islanders perceive social problems associated with 
Solomon Taiyo in this way? I propose that stories about social problems, 
including the tendency to foreground foreigners in representations of these 
problems, are part of a widespread discourse of development in Solomon 
Islands. This discourse, like all discourses in all societies, is colored by the 
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social relations and identities of the people involved, corresponding with 
the roles attributed to different groups in the discourse.
Representations such as those above tend to portray locals as passive 
“impactees” and foreigners as active impactors. Relations between locals 
and foreigners are portrayed as hierarchical, with locals subordinated. 
As mentioned earlier, postcolonial scholars have argued that colonial his-
tories of racism and domination have caused nonwhite peoples to have 
a “frog perspective.” Richard Wright, drawing on Nietzsche, described 
oppressed subjectivity as an “angle of vision—an outlook of people look-
ing upward from below” (paraphrased by Gilroy 1993, 160–161). This 
phenomenon has also been called “colonialism of the mind” (Nandy 
1988). Critical development theorists argue that contemporary relations 
of economic assistance perpetuate this kind of hierarchical identification 
between development donors (many being former colonizers, including 
Japan) and recipients (many being former colonies) (Sachs 1997). Some 
researchers have found that the experience of having been colonized may 
heighten sensitivity that foreign investment could lead to exploitation 
(Cherry 2006). Such sensitivity seems to be exhibited in Solomon Islander 
and Papua New Guinean responses to Asian fisheries investment.
Was the “Asianness” of the investment a significant contributing fac-
tor in the negativity with which these companies were portrayed? There 
is anti-Asian sentiment in both societies, evidenced by anti-Chinese riots 
against the Ramu NiCo nickel mine in Papua New Guinea in 2009 and 
riots targeting ethnic Chinese businesses in Honiara in 2006, both of 
which harnessed ongoing resentment of the greater wealth and the cul-
tural and business practices of local Chinese communities (Crocombe 
2007; Atkinson 2009). Judith Bennett traced the history of anti-Chinese 
sentiment in Solomon Islands and found that a significant contributing 
factor was white colonial bad-mouthing of Chinese, whom they por-
trayed as exploitative and morally corrupting of Islanders. Bennett noted 
that there was no evidence that the Chinese were any more exploitative 
of locals than were white colonials. The explanation for white denuncia-
tions of Chinese influences seems to be that white people were threatened 
in their dominance of business because Chinese traders and eating houses 
offered cheaper goods and a more inviting atmosphere to locals than did 
the trade stores and clubs owned by whites (Bennett 1987, 206–209). 
Contemporary involvement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 
Africa is likewise denounced by Western commentators as corrupting and 
exploitative, but Chinese involvement in Africa arguably follows the pat-
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tern of the capitalist world system and is very similar to (not worse than) 
ongoing Western involvement (Sautman and Yan 2008). Joel Atkinson 
has shown how unfounded accusations by Australian officials against Tai-
wanese influence in domestic politics entered Solomon Islander discourse 
about the Taiwanese via English-language media (2009). Negative charac-
terizations of Chinese are sometimes extended to Asians as a whole in the 
Pacific, across the disparate groups of “old” and “new” Chinese immi-
grants, Taiwanese, Chinese Malaysians, Japanese, Okinawans, Koreans, 
and Filipinos.7 Fishing in the Pacific is often lumped with logging and 
mining in being seen as unsustainable extractive industries dominated 
by Asian companies. The anti-Asian attitudes apparent in some repre-
sentations of Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna should be understood in this 
light—as being influenced by a range of factors beyond actual actions by 
Asians. Furthermore, the existence of anti-Asian sentiments in representa-
tions of fisheries investment should not be taken to mean that Papua New 
Guineans and Solomon Islanders only opposed the companies because 
they were Asian. White colonialism is within living memory, and Western 
multinational corporations are seen as equally likely to cause negative 
impacts (Barclay 2007).
The tendency to foreground the role of foreigners in problems arising 
from the companies, therefore, could be seen as a reflection of national 
identities in Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Global discourses 
of race as well as of Third World exploitation at the hands of foreign 
companies are woven into the Solomon Islander and Papua New Guinean 
nationalisms evident in representations of Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna. 
This comes through clearly in excerpts from a letter to the editor of the 
Solomon Star about Solomon Taiyo. Written by “a concerned national-
ist,” the letter described the company as operating under a “blueprint 
of Japanese imperialism” and noted that there were no Japanese work-
ers in the factory, only “Black faces”; local workers were described as 
“human tools” and “unskilled, half educated cheap labour.” The letter 
writer accused Solomon Taiyo of taking fish resources “without equita-
ble returns to us people of Munda and the whole nation.” The writer 
described Solomon Taiyo as a “crime against our people” and concluded 
that “we do not need such development” (Solomon Star 1995).
The tendency to view company activities in terms of a nationalist us/
them dichotomy pervaded all sorts of representations of Solomon Taiyo. 
When discussing the company’s regional marketing strategy, the deputy 
general manager said he expected that Fijian consumers would prefer to 
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buy pafco tuna to support their local industry. He said Solomon Taiyo 
should not market aggressively in Fiji and “upset their own rightful mar-
ket” because “once nationalistic feeling comes in, of course, it is better 
that they go for their own canned tuna than [for] someone else’s.”8 When 
discussing with ngo leader Panatina the differences between ways women 
and men use income, I mentioned that Okinawan fishermen’s wives had 
control of the money earned through Solomon Taiyo and tended to use 
it for the benefit of the family as a whole (such as for improvements in 
housing and education). Panatina, however, saw quite a different meaning 
in this story; she reacted bitterly to hearing that money earned by Oki-
nawans in Solomon Islands went overseas.9
There was also a strong element of economic nationalism in repre-
sentations of foreign fisheries investment in Papua New Guinea. Peter 
Donigi, former PNG permanent representative to the United Nations, 
wrote a piece published in The National advocating that foreigners not 
be allowed to fish in PNG waters. Aid should be used to help the PNG 
government buy a fishing fleet so Papua New Guineans could fish them-
selves and trade their way out of least-developed country status (Donigi 
2005). In representations of rd Tuna, a national “we” was most evident 
in debates over the levels of localization in the workforce, reflecting a 
widespread belief that foreigners were taking jobs that should have gone 
to Papua New Guineans. An investigation into rd Tuna’s localization was 
launched by Prime Minister Michael Somare in 2003 (Frank and Naisi 
2003).10
The fact that “local” is usually understood as Solomon Islander or 
Papua New Guinean in these representations is interesting, because sub-
national ethnic identities are often far more prominent than national ones 
in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands. Indeed, these countries are 
usually noted for their lack of national identity. Subnational rivalries dom-
inate the PNG political agenda, and national economic development strat-
egies are often weakened by the political necessity to distribute projects 
across regional groupings (Reilly 2008). In Solomon Islands there is much 
friction between groups from the island of Malaita and groups from other 
parts of the country. Tensions between Malaitan settlers and local peo-
ple around the capital Honiara on the island of Guadalcanal sparked the 
social unrest that caused the Solomon Islands state to fail between 2000 
and 2003. Christine Dureau has argued that Solomon Islands nationalism 
is fractured because people from the west of the country did not have the 
same anticolonial experiences as people from the east, due to struggles 
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such as the Maasina Rule movement, which was centered in Malaita in the 
years following World War II (Dureau 1998).
Subnational rivalry was a strong element in the politics surrounding 
Solomon Taiyo. It was addressed in company policies to prevent consoli-
dation of any one island group in particular work areas, and in exhorta-
tions for employees to “look after wantoks (kinship groups) after hours”—
that is, not to bring these loyalties into the workplace. Complaints about 
Solomon Taiyo from people from the Western Province included protests 
that the company employed too many easterners (particularly Malaitans) 
when the company’s location in the west of the country meant western-
ers should have priority, and that easterners should not be encouraged 
to migrate to the west. Subnational identities, however, were relatively 
less important than national identification in the sense of exploitation at 
the hands of Solomon Taiyo. There were obvious disparities in pay and 
seniority between Solomon Islanders and expatriate employees within the 
company, whereas there was no clear structural discrimination between 
island groups (Barclay 2004).
Significant subnational politics were also at play in some of the public 
complaints against rd Tuna. A widely cited social impact assessment of 
the company presented the perspectives of groups from the Madang area 
of Papua New Guinea who had lost their land when it had been alienated 
during the colonial era for a Church mission and had since been occu-
pied by rd Tuna (Sullivan and others 2003). These people were left with-
out land for growing food, which made them significantly disadvantaged 
compared to most other Papua New Guineans. The social impact study, 
and the representations of rd Tuna by nongovernmental organizations 
drawing on that study, argued that these dispossessed people should have 
priority for benefits from the company in terms of employment, train-
ing, and ownership of spin-off businesses doing cleaning, transport, and 
stevedoring for rd Tuna. From this perspective, the salient “we” con-
structed against rd Tuna (and against the government, the Church, and 
other Papua New Guineans who might take these opportunities) referred 
to the dispossessed groups, not Papua New Guineans as a whole. This 
perspective, however, was only relevant to the displaced groups in the Siar 
area of Madang Province (see map 2) and did not displace the nationalism 
with which many viewed rd Tuna.
Class is another kind of grouping of interests and identities that cuts 
across national identity in representations of Solomon Taiyo and RD Tuna. 
Different class groups did not align with distinct representations of these 
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companies. Villagers, waged workers, managers, public servants, and poli-
ticians all foregrounded criticisms in representations of the companies, 
relating similar stories about negative social and environmental impacts 
and highlighting the role of foreigners in problems associated with the 
companies. This illustrates the nationalist nature of the sentiments under-
lying these representations. Class groupings were pertinent, but rather 
than being visible in the form of the representations, they played out in 
the political and economic potentials of the representations, something I 
expand on in the next section of this article.
What was the nature of this nationalism inspired by the operations of 
Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna? This question is perhaps easiest to answer 
by first mentioning the kinds of nationalism it was not. The kind of 
nationalism evident in representations of Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna 
did not constitute cultural affinity across subnational groupings or a 
sense of collective effort for a common national goal. It was neither a 
cultural nor a civic nationalism (Smith 1991), nor a developmentalist 
nationalism (Desai 2008). At play was a kind of “imagined community” 
(Anderson 1983), but it was a reactive one. Representations of rd Tuna 
and Solomon Taiyo did not paint a clear picture of what the community 
was or wanted; rather, the representations were concerned with what 
the community was against: their exploitation by outsiders. The national 
identities exhibited in representations of Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna 
may thus be described as being negatively constructed in opposition to 
processes of “development” that are seen as inherently detrimental to the 
in-group because they are executed by external significant Others. Was 
this post-developmentalist nationalism, perhaps? Certainly it was anti-
neocolonialist nationalism.
The national identities visible in representations of Solomon Taiyo and 
rd Tuna have much in common with the national identities visible in the 
writings and speeches of key political figures from the independence era, 
such as Bernard Narakobi (PNG) and Peter Kenilorea (Solomon Islands). 
Both invoked the idea of the “Melanesian Way,” drawing on anticolonial 
movements in Africa and elsewhere around the world in the preceding 
decades, to valorize aspects of ethnic identity that differentiate them from 
the colonizers and neocolonizers (Narakobi 1983; Keesing 1982).
Interactions with foreign investor companies like rd Tuna and Solo-
mon Taiyo placed people in national collectivities through their logics 
of production, consumption, and divisions of labor (Foster 2002). For 
example, both Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna (in common with most other 
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employer organizations in both countries) differentiated employee roles 
and remuneration along lines of nationality, related to relative levels of 
national “development.” Both companies invested locally because (among 
other reasons), in these “developing” countries, local labor was cheap. 
However—and also because of the developing country status—the local 
population was seen as lacking the skills and knowledge for leading roles 
within the company, so the latter roles were filled by people from “more 
developed” countries, where remuneration expectations were correspond-
ingly higher. And because working in a developing country is seen as a 
hardship post, they were paid even more (Barclay 2004; Barclay and Cart-
wright 2007). Positions of power and authority, as well as remuneration 
scales, therefore explicitly placed people (hierarchically) within national 
groupings. The products of these companies—with an export grade des-
tined for Europe or the United States and the by-products sold in local 
and regional markets—also grouped people nationally as (more or less 
wealthy) consumers, a point expanded on in the following section.
The identities “Solomon Islander” and “Papua New Guinean” con-
tained in representations of rd Tuna and Solomon Taiyo thus have sev-
eral defining features. They were predominantly economically nationalist, 
mixed in with both narrow subnational and broad regional and global 
anti-neocolonialist identities, but they were not based on a sense of 
national ethnic belonging or collective striving for a common goal. They 
were constructed against processes of development that were managed 
and owned by Asian foreigners, who were understood as exploitative of 
Pacific Islander locals. The next section of this article explores the signifi-
cance of this type of national identity, considering what identifying nega-
tively against foreign investment through stories of corporate wrongdoing 
means for “development” in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.
Effects of Negative Impact as a Discourse of Identity
One way to interpret negative stories about Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna is 
as a form of resistance. A simple example of this is that vociferous public 
protests against companies are a form of political pressure that may help 
bring about desired change. In 2003, rd Tuna was causing pollution in 
the surrounding area because part of its factory was not connected to the 
wastewater treatment system and thus was sending untreated wastewater 
into local waterways. This problem was compounded when the work-
ers’ toilets broke down—hundreds of workers were using a nearby field, 
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from which runoff entered a stream during rain. Public protests against 
the wastewater problem at rd Tuna in 2003 led to a government inves-
tigation, and by 2004 the company had fixed the toilets and connections 
to the wastewater treatment plant (Hickey 2003; Dau 2003; Post Courier 
2003).11 Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands provincial and national 
governments have not been proactive in bringing companies to task over 
environmental problems. Indeed, correspondence among the Noro Town 
Council, the Western Province Government, concerned residents, and the 
company over problems with Solomon Taiyo’s wastewater in the 1990s 
revealed that there was not the legislative capacity to prosecute the com-
pany for causing pollution, even if there had been the executive will.12 
In twenty-seven years of operation, Solomon Taiyo was never penalized 
by the government for causing environmental problems. Given the lack 
of government initiative to address environmental problems arising from 
these companies, strident public protest was one of the only options for 
locals seeking redress.
Negative impact stories also served as resistance on the symbolic level. 
The “Solomon Blue” poem presented earlier in this article is a strong 
assertion of cultural identity, as are other poems by the same poet that 
critique development (Sipolo 1981, 1986; Makini 2007). By represent-
ing these companies as exploiting local people, the symbolic violence of 
categorization as least-developed countries can be transformed into a kind 
of symbolic weapon to protest subordination in the world system. The 
following quote deploys a negative representation of Solomon Taiyo in 
this way:
[Solomon Taiyo’s] local processing is largely export-oriented, whereby the 
choice tuna meat is bound for foreign markets. What is consumed in the islands 
is often of poor quality, made from brown flakes (the part of the tuna that ends 
up as pet food in some Western countries). Such products are nonetheless still 
a popular food item among Solomon Islanders because of the prohibitive price 
of the export grade. (Samou 1999, 149)
A reader could understand from this passage that Solomon Islanders are 
eating substandard food and would prefer to eat the light meat canned 
tuna but cannot afford it. Certainly light meat tuna is more expensive than 
Solomon Blue flake in Solomon Island shops, and most Solomon Island-
ers have very limited cash incomes, but it does not necessarily follow that 
flake meat is poor quality or that Solomon Islanders would prefer light 
meat. Quality and preference in this case are culturally contingent. The 
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brown meat has more blood in it and has a stronger “fishy” flavor and 
smell, so in cultures where low-smell, lighter-color varieties of fish are 
preferred, such as the English-speaking world, the dark part of the fish can 
only be sold as pet food. But the dark meat is no less nutritious, indeed it 
is probably more so, and in cultures where the strong flavor of skipjack is 
popular, the dark part of the meat may be enjoyed. Many Solomon Island-
ers feel the Solomon Blue flake product has more flavor than the light 
meat. For Solomon Islanders living abroad, Solomon Blue has a status 
somewhat like Vegemite (a by-product of beer manufacturing) for Aus-
tralians; it is valued highly as a “taste of home.” In 2005, the Supabarn 
supermarket chain in Canberra, where there is a Melanesian community 
around diplomatic missions and the universities, was selling Solomon Blue 
at the same price as light meat tuna.
Deborah Gewertz and Frederick Errington have explored the complex 
political, economic, and identity issues surrounding Pacific Islanders eat-
ing products they know white people refuse to eat or indeed see as only fit 
for animal consumption (2010). Solomon Blue and rd Tuna’s equivalent 
flake products could be seen as similar to Gewertz and Erring ton’s lamb 
flaps in that they are eaten with enjoyment and perform an important 
national nutritional role, yet, as by-products from the production of white 
people’s food, are troubling to senses of self in postcolonial countries 
struggling with persistent economic development problems. Gewertz and 
Errington pointed out, however, that not all foods rejected by white peo-
ple are equally troubling. They cited canned brined beef brisket, another 
food Pacific Islanders know white people don’t eat, but which is not seen 
as being “dumped” on Pacific Islanders in the same way as lamb flaps 
(Gewertz and Errington 2010, 146). Solomon Blue may be more like 
canned brisket than lamb flaps in this respect—if not for Samou, then at 
least for the people paying top dollar for it in Canberra.
The following story about relations between villagers and Solomon 
Taiyo fishing vessels may also be interpreted as a form of protest, in this 
case about bad treatment of villagers by Solomon Taiyo and the national 
government Fisheries Department.
[A]s this abundant fishery is “discovered” by more and more Asian ships mov-
ing ever southward, locals are noticing the impact of large fishing ships on 
their catches. A fisher of Lengana village explains: “The Japanese fleet gets 
permission from the [Solomon Islands] Fisheries Department. The boats come 
right close to the reefs where our people usually do their fishing. They don’t 
ask permission in the village; they just go there. And villagers are asking: ‘Why 
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are these people fishing in our sea?’ They do not know that the sea is open and 
that Fisheries can just let anyone fish anywhere. . . .
“And the Japanese fleets do not want to share anything with the villager 
people. Normally if you fish on that reef, you must share your catch with 
the villagers. The village elders spoke strongly to them and pointed out their 
mistakes. So the Japanese people just give a bit of fish, not much.” (Kalgovas 
2000)
An interesting difference between this quote and the others presented in 
this article is that the others, while partial, are not inaccurate, whereas this 
picture is somewhat exaggerated. Assuming it is a faithful transcription of 
what the fisher from Lengana (a village on Simbo Island; see map 1) said 
to the reporter, the exaggeration strengthens the sense that this is a repre-
sentation, with all the social baggage that entails. The system of permis-
sion for use of reef and lagoon areas was developed during the 1970s and 
was well established by the early 1980s (Blaber, Milton, and Rawlinson 
1993). Permission was administered by the Fisheries Department, but any 
business in Solomon Islands (or Papua New Guinea) must also have local 
permission or locals will simply not allow the business to go ahead. From 
the outset of Solomon Taiyo, reefs and lagoons were treated as held under 
customary tenure, with royalties for fishing payable to local landowners 
(Kabui 1997). In some cases, there were disputes over who had rights to 
royalties as landowners, and royalties were never distributed to all vil-
lagers because villages included settlers from inland areas, who were not 
considered landowners. The royalties were not large (in 1999 they were 
around us$22 per vessel per night). For these and other reasons, bait-
fishing was sometimes opposed from within villages. In these cases, the 
company would cease using the disputed area because it did not want to 
risk having expensive equipment damaged by angry villagers. There were 
enough registered baitgrounds that the company could stop using particu-
lar areas without operational difficulties. Sharing fish from the catch was 
a widespread practice because a small portion of each catch was damaged 
or consisted of species that were of no commercial value to the company, 
so crews traded these fish with nearby villages, often in exchange for fresh 
fruit and vegetables (Barclay 2008). This is not to say that the company 
was being altruistic. Doing these things cost Solomon Taiyo very little 
(nothing, in the case of giving bycatch to villagers and of ceasing to use 
disputed areas) and enabled the company to have easy access to a cheap 
source of baitfish; thus there was no reason not to oblige. The Solomon 
Islanders I interviewed in baitfishing communities knew that permission 
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of local communities was necessary, that royalties were paid to registered 
baitground owners, and that trading for or gifting of fish from the vessels 
was widespread. Nevertheless, stories like this one from the fisher from 
Lengana persisted. Why?
Beyond protesting the unfair situation whereby a foreign-dominated 
company could make money from marine resources while villagers had 
very little opportunity to earn cash, this representation could also have 
served a more immediate and pragmatic aim. In Solomon Islands and 
Papua New Guinea, neither the government nor the private sector provide 
adequate services for health, education, communications, employment, 
or transportation to the majority of the population. Goods and services 
have to be won though skillful approaches to appropriate patrons, includ-
ing aid donors and nongovernmental organizations (Cox 2007).13 The 
reporter to whom the fisher from Lengana told his story was an employee 
of the conservation nongovernmental organization wwf (World Wide 
Fund for Nature), which is active in Solomon Islands and funds liveli-
hoods projects as a way of encouraging people not to harvest endangered 
marine species such as turtles. Creatively manipulating dominant groups’ 
discourses and playing dominant groups against each other provide an 
avenue for subordinated peoples to achieve their ends (Ramos 1998, 16, 
98–101). Discourses of negative impact from Solomon Taiyo that utilized 
globally circulating negative images of Asian fisheries may thus have been 
useful for villagers approaching Western nongovernmental organizations 
for economic assistance.
In a related vein, discourses of negative impact may be used to leverage 
benefits from the global nature of contemporary capitalism. Anna Tsing 
has pointed out the problems of protecting labor and the environment in 
contemporary forms of “supply chain capitalism,” but also noted that 
positive change may be brought about through bringing to light in the 
location of consumption the labor exploitation that has gone on in other 
places to produce those commodities (Tsing 2009). This way of using 
global networks and communication to ameliorate problems caused by 
global capital was made famous by Naomi Klein (2000). The “Friends 
of Kana nam” website quoted earlier was no doubt created with this in 
mind.
Politicians also criticized Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna, although in their 
case denunciations of the companies could serve quite different ends. In 
1997 Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni, in the last few months before he 
lost the government, launched a scathing attack against Solomon Taiyo, 
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with an inquiry involving officials from several ministries into accusations 
of technical incompetence, improper recruitment of foreigners over Solo-
mon Islanders, the sending of contract work overseas unnecessarily, and 
the exportation of capital.14 At that time, the Solomon Islands govern-
ment had been the major shareholder of Solomon Taiyo for more than a 
decade, and Mamaloni had been prime minister for much of that period, 
so any problems with Solomon Taiyo were at least in part his respon-
sibility. Public perceptions of the company as dominated by foreigners, 
however, enabled him to play the economic nationalist card, distracting 
attention from the shortcomings of his government.
Negative representations of the companies could thus be used for cyni-
cal political aims, but more often they constituted a form of resistance. In 
some cases the resistance was symbolic, in others it was a concrete tool 
to achieve change from the government, from nongovernmental organiza-
tions, or from the companies themselves.
Anti-, Post-, or Locally Appropriate Development?
Negative representations of the companies also had other effects, one of 
which was to contribute to the difficult business environment in these 
countries. Nationalistic attitudes against foreign investment can be one 
of the intangible obstacles discouraging investment (Cherry 2006; Kim 
and Lee 2007). Widespread perceptions of the companies as socially and 
environmentally destructive meant the companies had a lack of good-
will. Negative public images of the companies went hand-in-hand with 
large amounts of petty sabotage against the companies. Many Solomon 
Islander interviewees talked of disgruntled villagers damaging the under-
water lights, small boats, and nets used for baitfishing. These pieces 
of equipment were worth tens of thousands of dollars apiece, so such 
events added considerably to Solomon Taiyo’s operating costs. Similarly, 
rd Tuna had ongoing costs associated with low levels of goodwill. The 
“Friends of Kananam” quote presented earlier in this article is from a 
much-publicized website calling for a boycott of rd Tuna products and 
quoting representatives of the dispossessed landowner groups. A local 
nongovernmental organization, the Bismark-Ramu Group (brg), had 
been working with these groups, although a legal investigation found that 
brg had not created the website. In an attempt to counter this negative 
publicity, rd Tuna took the dispossessed landowner groups and brg to 
court, but eventually their case was overturned, and rd had to pay costs. 
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The court action was expensive for rd Tuna and generated negative pub-
licity that had the potential to damage buyer contracts. In the primary end 
markets for canned tuna in the United States and the European Union, 
retailers’ concern about their reputation for corporate social responsibil-
ity means that they have refused to buy canned tuna from sources they 
fear will damage their reputation (Campling 2008). Following the court 
action, rd Tuna was nominated by an Australian nongovernmental orga-
nization, Friends of the Earth, for a “Public Eye on Davos” award for bad 
corporate citizenship (Erklärung von Bern nd). Deploying discourses of 
negative impact globally in this way may achieve desired change in com-
pany practices, but equally it may result in investors deciding the situation 
is “too hard” and withdrawing.
Could the petty damage done to Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna by narra-
tives of negative impact be characterized as a victory of postdevelopment? 
Could it be argued that Solomon Islanders and Papua New Guineans did 
not need or want capitalist development in the form of industrial tuna fish-
ing, with smelly canning factories providing poorly paid work and spoil-
ing their coastal environments? The answer is complicated because, while 
they had undeniable problems with these companies, people also valued 
the opportunities the companies brought. People appreciated the chance 
to earn cash—which is necessary for schooling, health care, and store-
bought commodities—and wanted the choice to take part in the modern 
economy. The main cash-earning activity for women around Madang has 
been selling goods, such as food, in local markets. Women could make 
around 150 kina per week in the markets. Women who worked at the rd 
cannery took home around one-third that amount, but apparently many 
younger women preferred the prestige of working in a modern factory, 
in contrast to the market-selling undertaken by their older women rela-
tives.15 It is therefore overly simplistic to say that negative representations 
were part of consistent antidevelopment attitudes. The complicated real-
ity is that Solomon Islanders and Papua New Guineans have valued the 
opportunities offered by these companies but at the same time have not 
wholeheartedly embraced foreigner-dominated capitalist enterprise. They 
want development (in forms appropriate to local society), but they also 
want less domination by foreigners. Attacks on foreign companies further 
one part of that desire, while they possibly stymie the other.
Stories of negative impact contribute to the unproductive back-and-
forth of pro- versus antidevelopment arguments. In the case of rd Tuna, 
this kind of debate played out in articles and letters to the editor printed 
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in two local newspapers, the Post Courier and The National. The Post 
Courier ran several articles and letters to the editor that were critical of 
RD Tuna in 2003–2004, while The National, spearheaded by journal-
ist Alfredo Hernandez, published articles that lauded the development 
achievements of rd Tuna, attacked the groups opposing rd, and denied 
that their complaints had any validity whatsoever (Post Courier 2003; 
Puton 2004; Peter 2003; Frank and Niesi 2003; The National 2003; 
Hickey 2003; Dau 2003). If people want to reform rd Tuna to facilitate 
more locally appropriate forms of development, this kind of exchange is 
possibly counterproductive.
Instead, it might be useful to debate what local development might 
look like and how companies like rd Tuna could be changed to better 
facilitate it. Morgan Brigg has suggested that locally appropriate political 
development could draw on wantokism (2009). Wantokism is generally 
represented by outsiders as an obstacle to good governance, but Brigg 
showed that by rethinking the fit between wantokism and modern demo-
cratic government systems it could actually be used as a check and balance 
to improve governance. Local economic cultural features and their role in 
development could be similarly rethought.
Tsing offered an alternative framework for viewing the opportunities 
offered to Islander employees by companies like Solomon Taiyo and rd 
Tuna (2009). In analyzing “supply chain capitalism,” a type of capitalism 
that encompasses the global tuna production in which Solomon Taiyo 
and rd Tuna are engaged, she found that diversity plays a special role. 
Companies using global supply chains of contractors make use of this 
diversity to locate labor-intensive parts of production in places or popu-
lations with low labor costs, which is obviously exploitative and undoes 
the progress made toward improving working conditions by unions in 
now-wealthy countries in the early and mid twentieth century. But at the 
same time, capitalists cannot control diversity; in allowing it for their 
own ends, they enable people working in these supply chains to adapt 
work for their particular aspirations. In Tsing’s framework, “supply 
chains are not always evil—they also open alternatives—[and] creative 
alternatives emerg[e] from within the interstices between capitalist and 
non-capitalist spaces” (2009, 171). She talked specifically of combining 
livelihoods with cultural and social goals. Tsing’s examples are of farm-
ers and mushroom pickers who are independent contractors rather than 
employees like Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna’s workers, but her ideas may 
nonetheless be adapted.
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For example, Solomon Taiyo and rd Tuna management both com-
plained about extra labor costs incurred through high levels of absentee-
ism in the workforce. Absenteeism had various causes, including difficult 
living, commuting, and working conditions, but one of the contributing 
causes was that in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands there are 
strong social obligations and desires to do things other than cash work, 
and customary tenure gives people viable economic alternatives to full 
time cash work. Some commentators propose that the solution is to break 
customary tenure so that Pacific Islanders become wholly dependent on 
the cash economy (Gosarevski, Hughes, and Windybank 2004). Remov-
ing the safety net customary tenure provides against the vagaries of the 
cash economy would arguably cause great economic hardship, and cus-
tomary tenure is one of the bulwarks of local cultures, so this is not a way 
to foster locally appropriate development. An alternative approach would 
be to find ways to adapt cash activities and customary tenure such that 
they may coexist more smoothly. A solution along these lines was appar-
ently found for the problem of absenteeism in a Marshall Islands tuna-
loining plant. Instead of engaging individuals, employment opportunities 
were extended to family groups. Each family had two or three trained 
and experienced workers and arranged for one to turn up for each shift, 
giving the employer assurance of a certain number of bodies, and giving 
employees flexibility to maintain their lives outside cash work.16 This kind 
of approach might improve on the discourse of negative impact in terms 
of facilitating locally appropriate development.
Resistance or Reification of Domination?
Discourses of negative impact may be interpreted as a form of ongoing 
“colonialism of the mind,” in which local ethnic identity is subordinated 
to outsiders (Kabutaulaka 1997). K R Howe has traced the historical 
development of the idea that Pacific Islanders suffered a “fatal impact” 
from their contact with Europeans and modernity (1984). The assumption 
that “European entry into the Pacific meant doom and disaster for the 
islands’ inhabitants” began with early admirers of the noble savages and 
continued on through social Darwinism and the proposition that the Mel-
anesians were a dying race (Howe 1984, 348). These ideas have persisted 
despite a generation of Pacific historians who questioned the assumption 
of omnipotent power on the part of colonials and who, in focusing on the 
activities of Pacific Islanders themselves, discovered other ways of view-
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ing the changes brought about by contact with Europeans and modernity. 
Howe argued that “to see Islanders as passive, helpless, and always perse-
cuted and suffering at the hands of Europeans not only excludes modern 
research findings but, it is now argued, denies the Islanders their essen-
tial humanity” (1984, 351–352). Howe’s fatal impact theory shares some 
central tenets with Marshall Sahlins’s “despondency theory” (2000) and 
Judith Bennett’s “mentalities of dependency” (2002). Engagement with 
foreigners and their modernity has since the 1900s been characterized 
by foreigners bringing modern “cargo,” as well as expertise in modern 
governance and modern business, through colonialism and postcolonial 
aid programs. For their part, Pacific Islanders have come to expect and 
rely on this pattern in their relations with foreigners and their moderniza-
tion projects, be they aid schemes or foreign investment, and to be disap-
pointed when companies do not act as charities (Bennett 2002).
Negative identity construction in responses to Solomon Taiyo and RD 
Tuna often demonstrated a sense of subordination along these lines. A 
Pacific Islands Monthly article about sexually transmitted diseases and 
unplanned pregnancies in Noro cited the executive director of the Solo-
mon Islands Planned Parenthood Association as saying “the majority of 
these girls have always lived with their parents and have led sheltered 
lives until they come to Noro—without their parents around and with 
very limited knowledge and experience to handle men and the new kind 
of freedom they find in Noro, the girls are at the mercy of any sexually 
irresponsible male worker.” He was quoted as saying that women should 
be encouraged to “take control” of their lives and make wise decisions, 
but the overall tone of the article placed responsibility with the company, 
not the women involved or the social context in which they were raised. 
For example, the measures suggested for alleviating the situation, includ-
ing educational workshops and greater provision of contraceptives, were 
all to be carried out by the company. A Solomon Star article titled “Solo-
mon Taiyo Responsible for Educating its Workers” also discussed naive 
girls with sheltered upbringings and minimal education being vulnerable 
in Noro and held the company responsible for fixing this situation.17 
 Neither article included suggestions for local or national government, vil-
lages, churches, parents, or schools to prevent or solve social problems. 
Stories of negative impact from rd Tuna also often accorded the com-
pany full responsibility for causing and solving social problems arising in 
association with company activities. The social impact report on rd Tuna 
held the company responsible for helping people from the dispossessed 
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landowner groups to become successful employees and owners of spin-off 
businesses (and held it to blame when they did not), and recommended 
that rd Tuna should fund local schools and local clinics (Sullivan and 
 others 2003, 11, 50).
It could be said that given low government capacity to provide social 
welfare services, it is only practical to rely on the companies as patrons, 
and indeed governments have often led the call for companies to pro-
vide and maintain infrastructure such as roads and services in health, 
education, and transport. One problem with this approach is that fish-
ing companies are not expert in these areas. Another problem is that 
this approach locates the potential for generating positive social change 
within foreign companies rather than in local society. Local communities 
in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands are highly capable of orga-
nizing themselves and achieving a great deal, particularly for sporting, 
cultural, and church activities. Churches are very strong social forces in 
Noro and have worked to address some of the gender and sexual rela-
tions problems arising from Solomon Taiyo activities. Community elders 
(rather than the under-resourced police) were the main keepers of the 
peace when violence erupted between groups of young men from differ-
ent island groups in Noro. To represent the social disruption associated 
with fishing and processing operations as solely a company responsibil-
ity elides these efforts, downplaying the capacities of Solomon Islanders 
and Papua New  Guineans. Representations of multinationals as perpetra-
tors of negative social impact are thus double-edged; they challenge the 
legitimacy of domination by outsiders, but they also reify the domination 
through identifying local people as helpless in their engagement with for-
eign companies.
Conclusion
Complaints about negative impacts from Asian fisheries companies in the 
Pacific may be seen as representations of the social relations of develop-
ment. The representations analyzed in this article highlight the economic 
nationalism underlying ethnic identifications in these contexts. The sig-
nificance of this analysis is that these relations and identities affect Pacific 
Islanders’ engagement with foreign investment. Solomon Islanders’ and 
Papua New Guineans’ primary identification in relation to Asian fisheries 
investment is that they are negatively impacted by these companies. Histo-
ries of outsiders dominating locals and undeniable social and environmen-
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tal problems arising from capitalist enterprises contribute to this position. 
Stories of negative impact may be useful. Discourses of negative impact 
may constitute symbolic resistance against inequitable relations, and may 
also act concretely to enlist patronage to address problems in a context 
where clientelism is the norm and where the state cannot be relied on to 
provide much in terms of services or regulation. Governments, nongov-
ernmental organizations, and the companies themselves can be induced to 
act on problems through public protest about negative impacts.
However, discourses of negative impact also perpetuate disempowered 
images of local society. Furthermore, discourses of negative impact may 
feed into antidevelopment approaches to foreign investment; while most 
Solomon Islanders and Papua New Guineans are not against development, 
they are dissatisfied with the extent and types of development that have 
emerged for them thus far. Discourses of negative impact are thus double 
sided in that they act as resistance against the undesired parts of develop-
ment, yet can threaten the viability of businesses, including the desired 
aspects of their operations. Exactly what an ideal Papua New Guinean 
or Solomon Islands modernity might look like is not yet clear, but it is 
clear that people want better health, education, transportion, and com-
munication services, along with opportunities to earn cash and chances to 
participate in modern society, in ways that strengthen rather than dimin-
ish ongoing village- and customary tenure-based life. Working out locally 
appropriate blueprints of modernity and whether/how Asian fisheries 
companies can contribute to this development may require more open-
ended, and possibly less oppositional dialogue.
* * *
This paper was originally presented at a seminar hosted by the State, Soci-
ety and Governance in Melanesia project at the Australian National University 
and benefited greatly from audience feedback. Thanks also to Elaine Jeffreys and 
anonymous reviewers whose comments have significantly improved the paper.
Notes
1 This understanding of representations and discourses in social relations 
comes from the work of Michel Foucault (1991).
2 See also Barclay 2004 for an earlier version of the argument, which also 
explores gender and subnational ethnic identities.
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3 Panatina, interview by author, hand noted, Young Women’s Christian Asso-
ciation office, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 23 April 1999, emphasis added. In line 
with requirements of the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of 
Technology–Sydney, interviewees from Solomon Islands fieldwork in 1999 are 
referred to by pseudonyms.
4 Ziata, interview by author, tape recording, Noro Town Council offices, 
Noro, Solomon Islands, 22 June 1999; 1994 files from Noro Town Council (cf 
1/28) and Western Province Government (10/1/17 I).
5 Kira Kira, matron of Women’s Hostel at Baru, interview by author, hand 
noted, Noro, Solomon Islands, 23 June 1999.
6 Kindu, who worked for some years as a health worker for the Western Prov-
ince, interview by author, tape recording, Munda, Solomon Islands, 6 July 1999.
7 For further discussion on the extent to which negative images of Asians held 
by white people influence Islander identifications of Asians, as well as the com-
plexity of the “Asian” identity in this context, see Barclay 2007.
8 Deputy general manager, several interviews by author, tape recordings and 
handwritten notes, Solomon Taiyo Base at Noro, June–July 1999.
9 Panatina, interview by author, 23 April 1999.
10 According to rd Tuna management, there were 3,000 locals to 55 expatri-
ates in the cannery and 200 to 36 in the cold store, with the reverse situation on 
the fleet: around 5 locals to 35 expatriates on fishing vessels.
11 Clarence Hoot, manager of the PNG Investment Promotion Authority 
(ipa) and member of the government team that investigated rd pollution issues, 
interview by author, hand noted, ipa offices, Port Moresby, May 2005.
12 This correspondence is contained in files of the Noro Town Council (file 
numbers 8/3/11 and 9/1/7) and the Western Province Government (file number 
10/1/17 I).
13 A similar principle has long been employed by Pacific Island governments 
in the international sphere. During the Cold War, rivalry between the Soviet 
Union and the United States was utilized to leverage support from the United 
States (for example, in the 1980s by granting fishing access to USSR fleets). Solo-
mon Islands and Papua New Guinea both benefit from the rivalry between the 
People’s Republic of China and Taiwan by gaining aid from the version of China 
they diplomatically recognize.
14 Correspondence in 1997 files of the Solomon Islands National Union of 
Workers and the Western Province Government (10/1/17 I). For discussion about 
the extent to which the company was guilty of these charges, see Barclay 2008.
15 Barry Lalley, interview by author, hand noted, Jais Aben, Madang, Papua 
New Guinea, May 2005.
16 Simon Tiller, interview by author, hand noted, Fisheries Department, 
Kukum, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 5 July 2008.
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17 “Women News and Views” from the Pacific Islands Monthly (no author, 
issue number or page number, c.1994) and the Solomon Star article (no title, 
author, date or page number) were found in the files of Noro Town Council 
(8/3/5).
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Abstract
This article explores ethnic identities in representations of tuna fishing and can-
ning companies in Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. One point raised by 
the analysis is that while national identities in these countries are often disrupted 
by subnational ethnic identities, strong nationalist discourses pervade representa-
tions of these companies. The nationalism apparent in responses to these com-
panies is negative, reacting against perceived exploitation by foreigners through 
narratives of corporate wrongdoing. This article investigates the significance of 
this style of identification and questions whether the national identities entailed in 
negative representations of foreign investment constitute resistance against devel-
opment or a disempowering victim identification that reifies a subordinate posi-
tion in the world political economy.
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